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0042-6989/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Nothing to debate: ‘‘Frameworks’’ vs ‘‘layer’’ models
1.1. Unifying constancy and contrast
Responding to my critique of anchoring theory, Gilchrist states
that ‘‘Perhaps the most important ongoing debate in lightness the-
ory is that between layer models. . .and framework models. . ..’’ He
suggests that both outlooks succeed and fail in complementary
ways. But Gilchrist’s criterion for failures of layer models seems
contingent on taking as a given what is actually the anchoring the-
ory’s central theoretical claim: that ‘‘background-dependent
errors’’ (referring to contrast effects) and ‘‘illumination-dependent
constancy errors’’ (referring to failures to properly factor relative
illumination into the lightness estimate) result from a common
underlying mechanism (Gilchrist et al., 1999). This uniﬁcation
was to be achieved via a functional unit called the ‘‘framework.’’
However, the effort has failed to produce a set of testable, unifying
assumptions. Not only has anchoring theory failed to incorporate
the perception of transparency into its theoretical framework; it
has also, as Gilchrist acknowledges in his response, failed to pro-
duce a principled account of simultaneous contrast. Furthermore,
its account of illumination-independent constancy is oddly vague
and incomplete. If there are no convincing theoretical arguments
in favor of the uniﬁcation of contrast and constancy effects, then
layer models cannot be faulted for not simultaneously attempting
to explain both.
1.2. Frameworks and layers in models of lightness
The core of the putative debate between framework and layer
models is described by Gilchrist as follows: ‘‘Layer models parse
the image into overlapping layers, with an upper layer represent-
ing perceived illumination or transparency and a lower layer
representing surface reﬂectance. Framework models typically
parse the image into adjacent frameworks, much like different
countries on a map.. . .’’ The distinction being made here is dubious
for a number of reasons.
First, Gilchrist seems to be confusing theory with fact. It is the
visual system, not theory, that parses the visual experience into
overlapping layers representing illumination/transparency and
underlying surfaces. Layer models, whether they succeed or fail,
simply attempt to specify the conditions under which such
layering occurs, and its consequences for lightness. Frameworks
models cannot theoretically dislodge perceptual facts, so these
facts cannot be considered a point of contention or debate. Indeed,
accurately describing the facts to be explained is the ﬁrst step inany theoretical formulation. Ignoring them, on the other hand, is
unlikely to produce powerful models or theories.
Second, even layer models necessarily involve the segregation
of the visual ﬁeld into areas that are adjacent, like countries on a
map. The impression of transparency, for example, is contingent
on perceiving only part of the visual ﬁeld as being under the
transparent layer. No model of perception can deny that the visual
ﬁeld is perceptually segmented into adjacent areas. So a simple ref-
erence to ‘‘frameworks vs layers’’ implies no ground for debate
between the anchoring model and any other model of perception.
As with layers, adjacency is a perceptual fact, not a theoretical
assumption.
Third, it is not the case that ‘‘frameworks models’’ do not parse
the image into layers. The most obvious case is the model
described by Bressan (2006) with its reference to the ‘‘overlay
framework’’ in transparency illusions. Layering theorists refer to
‘‘transparent overlays.’’ Does Bressan’s anchoring theory really
preserve a meaningful distinction between ‘‘frameworks’’ and
‘‘layers’’? Even without Bressan’s model, anchoring theory cannot
avoid layers. As described by anchoring theorists, frameworks
are not merely adjacent, like countries on a map. They are also
overlapping. For example, the target and background units in the
classic simultaneous contrast illusion, referred to by anchoring
theory as ‘‘local frameworks,’’ involve the amodal completion of
the background behind the target. At the same time, these units
exist within larger frameworks, and ultimately within the ‘‘global
framework.’’ This latter is amodally completed behind all of the
subsidiary frameworks. So we are obviously talking about segrega-
tion in depth, or layering, as well as adjacency. Anchoring theorists
also refer to depth boundaries, including occlusion boundaries, as
segregating factors. Again, this implies opaque, overlapping layers.
Finally, in discussing the ‘‘area rule,’’ Gilchrist (2006) refers to
‘‘perceived area,’’ thus including the amodally-perceived, lower
layer in the area estimate.
The fact that the anchoring theory has addressed only opaque
layers and not non-opaque layers, i.e. has declined to attempt a
‘‘frameworks of transparency’’ account analogous to its ‘‘frame-
works of illumination’’, despite a deep literature, both historic
and contemporary, on the factors that trigger transparency, is not
grounds for a debate with models that do make this attempt. Obvi-
ously, any account of transparency would need to include terms for
both the underlying surface and the transparent layer (as, via the
area rule, anchoring theory does for opaque layers) since each has
its own perceived reﬂectance or lightness. A unifying model, in
other words, is necessarily a layer model.
In sum, the statement that there is a debate because frame-
works parse the image [only] into adjacent frameworks while layer
models parse it [only] into layers is not accurate and does not
deﬁne any speciﬁc grounds for debate between ‘‘frameworks’’
and ‘‘layer’’ models. Both parse the image into areas that are
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The anchoring model of Gilchrist et al. (1999) claims to explain
contrast as well as constancy effects (and correlated errors), but
cannot explain the constancy of surfaces beneath transparencies.
Layer models address the latter but do not address contrast. How-
ever, they are not obliged to do so in the absence of compelling
arguments in favor of a uniﬁed model. Only the anchoring model
proposes to make such arguments. The burden is on it to show that
contrast, illumination, and transparency effects can be uniﬁed
under a single theoretical framework. Lacking a coherent account
even of contrast (see below), it would seem to be in no position
to defend a uniﬁed account assumption.
2. Edge classiﬁcation
In my critique, I suggested that, in contrast to its original claims,
the frameworks of anchoring theory had come to be deﬁned on the
basis of edge classiﬁcation. This notion was based on references to
‘‘frameworks of illumination’’ and various statements indicating
that according to the anchoring theory, ‘‘the retinal image is
segmented into frameworks based on two main factors: fuzzy
boundaries and depth boundaries (corners and occlusion bound-
aries)’’ (Zdravkovic, Economou, & Gilchrist, 2012, p. 782). In other
words, segregation into frameworks is currently being described as
relying mainly on factors typically correlated with illumination
boundaries. Gilchrist responds that ‘‘edge classiﬁcation retains an
important role in anchoring theory, but is supplemented by group-
ing processes.’’
Gilchrist’s statement implies a false dichotomy between edge
classiﬁcation and grouping processes. As with every aspect of the
organization of the visual ﬁeld, edge classiﬁcation is based on
grouping principles. The role of X-junctions, for example, is contin-
gent on the rule of continuity, which explains why we refer to ‘‘X’’
and not ‘‘V-plus-upside-down V-junctions.’’ Thus, Gilchrist’s
statement does not help to clarify the assumptions of anchoring
theory.
As regards the role of edge classiﬁcation per se, anchoring
theory’s references to depth boundaries and fuzzy boundaries con-
stitute a very partial description of the known factors underlying
the organization of the visual ﬁeld into areas perceived to differ
in their illumination. There exist much more nuanced descriptions
of these factors (within the context of layer models, for example).
Fuzzy boundaries and depth boundaries are not necessary to edge
classiﬁcation, as illumination boundaries may be perceived in the
absence of these factors. They are also not sufﬁcient: depth bound-
aries and fuzzy boundaries in no way guarantee that areas on
either side of the boundary will be perceived as differing in their
illumination. For example, we do not perceive the sides of an all-
white Necker cube to differ in their illumination; if we did, then
at least one of the sides should appear luminous or whiter than
white. Fuzziness obviously is too crude a term to specify the
requisite contrast relationships that need to hold if a boundary is
to act as an illumination boundary. In addition, anchoring theory
has not resolved apparent failures of a penumbra to segregate
regions, e.g. when a section of a surface under a shadow is per-
ceived to share the color of the surrounding surface.
It might be argued that the above-cited statements are a
shorthand for an actually better-developed model of edge-classiﬁ-
cation, but this does not seem to be the case. Given the devil-in-
the-details masses of lightness observations reviewed by
Gilchrist et al. (1999) and Gilchrist (2006), it seems odd for anchor-
ing theorists to be satisﬁed with such vague terms.
However the visual system manages it, there is no doubt that
correctly discerning illumination boundaries is a necessary part
of achieving reliable lightness estimates, nor that incorrectly
discerning them produces lightness errors. Even if anchoringtheory were to produce a complete or novel account of edge clas-
siﬁcation, this would not be equivalent to unifying contrast and
constancy.
Finally, it is not appropriate to attribute to anchoring theory (as
Gilchrist does) the insight that visual system does not (cannot)
directly estimate illumination level. That the visual system relies
on luminance ratios, rather than on local luminance per se, to
assign lightness values to surfaces is a direct consequence of the
impossibility of estimating illumination directly. If the visual
system were able to assess illumination directly, then pictorial
illusions of lightness constancy would not occur. These illusions
constitute empirical proof that illumination is not directly
estimated.
3. Simultaneous contrast
In his response, Gilchrist acknowledges that I ‘‘may have
spotted a previously unnoticed. . .contradiction in the theory’’ The
contradiction concerns how the classic simultaneous contrast
demonstration is said to be segregated into ‘‘frameworks.’’
Attempting to resolve the apparent difﬁculties of the theory in
justifying the primary grouping of target and background, Gilchrist
states that each target is grouped with its background ‘‘based on
the important factor of surroundedness.’’ Further on, he refers to
the reinforcing effect of ‘‘adjacency plus surroundedness.’’ This is
not a defensible claim.
Surroundedness is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to produce
simultaneous contrast. In the ‘‘dungeon’’ illusion (Bressan, 2001),
for example, targets fully surrounded by white lighten while those
fully surrounded by black darken. In the case of the Benary cross
and White’s illusion, contrast effects – quite strong in the latter
case – arise without surroundedness. The problem is that the
surroundedness/adjacency construction is local and thus struc-
ture-blind. (While in his response, Gilchrist notes the need to take
account of ‘‘the larger conﬁguration’’ rather than ‘‘solely at what is
happening at a local edge,’’ this general acknowledgment does not
seem to inform his speciﬁc explanations.)
In each of the above-cited examples, contrast effects are linked
to perceived ﬁgure–ground relationships. In other words, contrast
arises between targets and their perceived backgrounds, not sim-
ply between targets and retinally adjacent or surrounding areas.
(Since the target in the simultaneous contrast illusion is seen as
lying on top of the background, Gilchrist must be referring to ret-
inal rather than perceived adjacency). The correlation between
contrast and ﬁgure–ground effects is very well established. At
the very least, it is more widely-applicable and less spurious than
the surroundedness/adjacency claim.
Gilchrist himself contradicts the adjacency-surroundedness
proposal in various discussions. In his explanation of ‘‘reverse-con-
trast’’ illusions, grouping of non-adjacent patches is said to be
based on the alignment of their edges (Gilchrist, 2014a) while
non-adjacent patches in the dungeon illusion are said to group
on the basis of similarity (Gilchrist, 2014c).
In sum, according to the anchoring theory, the targets in the
simultaneous contrast illusion should be grouped with each other
based on the fact that a. their edges are aligned; b. they appear
coplanar with each other (a strong grouping factor according to
Zdravkovic, Economou, and Gilchrist (2012)); c. they are similar
in shape, reﬂectance and luminance. An occlusion boundary segre-
gates them from their backgrounds. In their turn, the backgrounds
are a. mutually aligned; b. coplanar; c. adjacent, and d. share a
sharp boundary (a strong grouping factor according to Gilchrist
et al. (1999)) and so should be strongly grouped with each other.
Yet the targets are said to be more closely grouped with their
backgrounds than either targets or backgrounds are with each
other. Anchoring theory’s account of simultaneous contrast, a
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and illumination-dependent errors’’ thus fails on its own terms.
(This is not to say that the target-background grouping is not
self-evident, only that anchoring theory cannot explain it.)
(Gilchrist’s observation that there are apparent contradictions
in observed contrast phenomena is no excuse. The role of theories
is to resolve apparent contradictions in the rules governing natural
phenomena, not to reproduce them in the form of contradictory
theoretical assumptions. In the latter case, they are not apparent,
but actual contradictions of the theory).
If one of the aims of the anchoring model is to model simulta-
neous contrast, it would seemmore practical to attempt to establish
the structural factors leading to the perception of the ﬁgure–ground
relationship – the perceived ﬁgure–ground relationship being the
most reliable known predictor of contrast effects. (This applies even
to surfaces bounded by contours perceived in the absence of
luminance differences, i.e. illusory contours.) As in the case of
edge-classiﬁcation, the issue has been much studied. It is not
enough for Gilchrist to claim, in his response, that ‘‘there is nothing
in anchoring theory to prohibit a role for ﬁgure/ground’’ in lightness
perception.’’ It is one thing not to ‘‘prohibit’’ a role for ﬁgure–ground
and another to construct a role for it in the context of a unifying the-
ory. A role for ﬁgure–ground is almost never proposed by Gilchrist
in his various accounts of the basic simultaneous contrast
demonstration, where the ﬁgure–ground relationship between
target and ground is self-evident. Instead, he substitutes references
to surroundedness and adjacency (Gilchrist, 2014b) or ‘‘belonging-
ness’’ (Gilchrist, 2014c), a termwhich lacks the perceptual clarity or
ecological relevance of ‘‘ﬁgure–ground’’ and is conceptually at odds
with the segregating nature of ﬁgure–ground organization. As I
noted in my critique, Gilchrist (Gilchrist, 2014b; Gilchrist, 2014c)
has also recently suggested that the effect is based on the similarity
of the backgrounds to spotlights or shadows, due to their ‘‘strong,
continuous sign.’’ This formulation also deﬁes the self-evidence of
the ﬁgure–ground structure, in which the target appears layered
on top of the background. And as with the surroundedness/adja-
cency formulation, it fails (where the ﬁgure–ground account does
not) in the case of many known contrast illusions, including the
dungeon illusion. Again, the anchoringmodel does not seem to offer
a uniﬁed account even within the domain of simultaneous contrast
effects.
There is no a priori reason to reject the view that simultaneous
contrast is functionally distinct from constancy, with its own
process based on natural selection for the distinct goal of enhanc-
ing the discriminability of ﬁgures from their backgrounds. This
possibility is acknowledged by Kardos (1934) when he states that
‘‘contrast, although it falsely suggests color difference where in fact
there is color equality, may in some circumstances be very useful
to object vision as border contrast’’ and that ‘‘Hering considered
this performance especially important’’ and a primary function of
the ‘‘complementary dependence’’ of surface appearance in
contrast effects (p. 79). If contrast and constancy, arise in different
contexts, produce different perceptual results, have potentially dif-
ferent functions and if the anchoring theory has not succeeded in
unifying them, then it is not clear why this view should not remain
part of the debate.
4. Anchoring
In any given situation, the visual system cannot simply assign
relative lightness values, it must assign speciﬁc values to surfaces,
and so must have an ‘‘anchoring rule.’’ For a number of reasons,
researchers past and present, including anchoring theorists, have
endorsed Wallach’s (1948) proposal of a ‘‘highest-luminance-
white’’ rule for most typical situations. However, in the contextof anchoring theory, the application of the rule is supposed to be
contingent on the segregation of the visual ﬁeld into the functional
units called ‘‘frameworks.’’ Furthermore, these frameworks are
supposed to vary in their strength or weakness in a principled
manner. Finally, as shown above, they are, de facto, multiply over-
lapping. As the anchoring theory has evidently not worked out a
coherent frameworks account of even a relatively simple stimulus
such as the simultaneous contrast demonstration, since its account
of edge classiﬁcation is vague, and since it is unable to deal with
areas we might call ‘‘frameworks of transparency,’’ it is difﬁcult
to see how it can effectively apply an anchoring rule to any given
visual image. The problem is not, as Gilchrist suggests, a failure to
‘‘completely operationalize’’ the theory, but the absence of a coher-
ent set of qualitative assumptions.
5. Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995) vs. Radonjic and Gilchrist
(2013)
Gilchrist does not see a contradiction between the ‘‘critical test’’
cited in Gilchrist et al. (1999) and the ﬁndings and assertions of
Radonjic and Gilchrist (2013). As I have described it, the contradic-
tion is simple. In the second instance, a visible penumbra produces
target lightness estimates consistent with lightness constancy, in
the ﬁrst instance it does not.
6. Allred et al. (2012)
I noted that anchoring theory assumptions do not seem able to
account for a stimulus, consisting of a set of coplanar squares pro-
ducing the impression of illumination and/or transparency effects,
used by Allred et al. (2012) and described by them as consistent
with the anchoring theory. This statement was not challenged by
Gilchrist. Gilchrist also objects to my suggestion that the lower con-
trast ratios within sections of these stimuli are consistent with
transparency. However, the observation that transparencies that
both transmit and reﬂect light reduce the contrast of the underlying
surfaces is not new. It is mentioned, for example, by Kardos (1934),
who states that this type of transparency ‘‘changes the initial light-
ness proportion between the inﬁeld and the surround ﬁeld in such a
manner that their lightness values get nearer to each other.’’
7. Unfalsiﬁable yet failing
The anchoring theory proposed by Gilchrist et al. (1999) aimed
to offer a simultaneous account of constancy and contrast on the
basis of a functional unit called the ‘‘framework.’’ This uniﬁed
account has not emerged. Instead, the frameworks approach has
produced multiple ad hoc accounts. While often contradicting each
other (i.e. falsifying each other), failures of these ad hoc accounts
are not registered as failures of the frameworks concept, because,
deﬁned no more concretely than as any de facto perceptual
grouping giving rise to lightness effects, it is valid. This is why,
as Gilchrist points out, I fell into the apparently contradictory posi-
tion of saying both that the theory was unfalsiﬁable and that it was
constantly failing. Its umbrella frameworks concept is not falsiﬁ-
able because it is true as far as it goes. But it is uninformative as
to the speciﬁcs of lightness estimation. It is its speciﬁc subsidiary
assumptions, meant to provide the missing theoretical content,
that fail consistently. These failures include, in addition to the
Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995)/Radonjic and Gilchrist (2013)
conﬂict, inconsistent ﬁndings regarding the role of ﬁgure–ground
by Economou, Zdravkovic, and Gilchrist (2007); regarding lumi-
nosity by Radonjic´ et al. (2011); regarding articulation by
Radonjic and Gilchrist (2013); regarding the Gelb effect by Ivory
and Gilchrist (2014).
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There is, at present, no working deﬁnition of anchoring theory’s
‘‘frameworks’’ – how their shape, strength, mutual inﬂuence are
determined – which anyone, including Gilchrist, can test, modify,
or compare with other proposals. Is there any reason to believe
that a single functional unit or principle of visual organization
can unify contrast and constancy? Anchoring theory has not made
the case. Absent a working deﬁnition of frameworks, there can be
no ‘‘anchoring theory of lightness’’ – research invoking anchoring
theory is ostensibly free of coherent theoretical constraints. The
mass of historical observations reviewed by Gilchrist (2006) and
those accrued since remains undigested.
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